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Résumé : L’analyse de la pertinence des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes financiers est essentielle : non 
seulement les investisseurs institutionnels utilisent ces prévisions lors de leurs évaluation et sélection d’actifs, mais 
elles permettent également d’évaluer le mode de formation des anticipations. Une spécificité bien connue de ces 
anticipations a récemment été mise en exergue, à savoir l’existence d’un biais positif : les experts ont tendance à 
surestimer les bénéfices lors de la réalisation de leurs prévisions. Dans ce travail, nous analysons les propriétés de ce 
biais selon les pays et les secteurs concernés, mais également selon la taille de la firme.  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The evaluation of the reliability of analysts’ earnings forecasts is an important aspect of research for 
different reasons: Many empirical studies employ analysts’ consensus forecasts as a proxy for the market’s 
expectations of future earnings in order to identify the unanticipated component of earnings, institutional investors 
make considerable use of analysts’ forecasts when evaluating and selecting individual sharesand the performance of 
analysts’ forecasts sheds light on the process by which agents form expectations about key economic and financial 
variables. The recent period put forward a well-known phenomenon, namely the existence of a positive bias in 
experts’ anticipations: the latter tend to over-estimate earnings. In this paper, we study the properties of this bias 
according to various aspects, that is to say according to country, sector, but also according to the size of the 
companies. 
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Introduction 
 
Average earnings forecast errors would be expected to tend toward zero, yet analysts’ forecasts have been 
empirically found to be positively biased (Brown 1993, O’Brien 1988, Brous and Kini 1993). Whether this 
optimism reflected in forecasts is intentional or unintentional could be subject to discussion between 
supporters of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and behavioural researchers.  
 
• Francis and Philbrick (1993) attribute a positive bias in earnings forecasts to the analyst-management 
relation. A followed company’s management is found to be an important source of information for 
financial analysts in predicting earnings. Analysts are anxious to accept the consequences of 
unfavourable forecasts imposed by the management of a firm; and therefore, are eager to produce 
overly optimistic reports. The findings of Francis and Philbrick can be employed to demonstrate that 
analysts’ rationality does not always coincide with semi-efficient earnings forecasting. In the described 
situation, alternative incentives may cause financial analysts’ rational actions to result in a decrease in 
forecast accuracy. However, analysts’ behaviour might still be explained by the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis - where costs of gathering, processing and reporting information are taken into 
consideration (cf. Jensen 1978). These transaction costs, i.e. discounted future costs of a distorted 
relation with the management of a company, may outweigh the benefits of increased forecast accuracy 
and allow for deliberately ignoring relevant, though costly information. Such an ‘information 
perspective’ partly contradicts Brown’s (1993) conclusion that “...a finding that analysts ignore publicly 
available information is unsatisfactory to capital market researchers who advocate semi-strong form 
market efficiency, but it is satisfactory to behavioural researchers who maintain that people 
consistently overweight some cues and underweight others...” and in a measure bring some empirical 
evidence on earnings forecast properties into agreement with capital market based research 
assumptions. 
• A second, more obvious explanation for a positive bias in earnings forecasts is the existence of a direct 
relation between  a followed company’s management and  a following company’s management. 
Investment bankers involved in forecasting earnings will force their analysts to cultivate relations with 
clients and on this behalf to act optimistically. Studies that notice this possibility are, for instance, those 
of Lin and McNichols (1993) and Dugar and Nathan (1995). Additionally, Dugar and Nathan 
empirically prove that private information exchanges between financial analysts faced with these 
incentives and the management of an investment bank’s client suffice to produce forecasts that are as 
accurate as those of non-investment banker analysts. Finally, a distinction can be made between sell-
side analysts and buy-side analysts. Most generally, sell-side analysts are employed at investment or 
brokerage firms, distributing their forecasts externally, whereas buy-side analysts forecast to advise 
their employer, i.e. banks, pension funds and insurance companies. Both types are subject to dissimilar 
incentives. As investment or brokerage firms participate in the underwriting of a firm’s stock, a 
conflict of interest may arise. Managers may pressure analysts under their supervision to produce 
positive recommendations (Lin and McNichols 1993) that indirectly force them to report overly 
optimistic earnings forecasts. Conroy and Harris (1995), who examined Japanese financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, confirm these results.  
• Both explanations bear on conscious actions of financial analysts, thus the bias at issue may be called 
reporting biases (see Francis and Philbrick 1993). Alternative explanations relate to processing biases. If 
forecast errors are associated with unanticipated macro-economic information that is negatively 
affecting many firms, then, on average, financial analysts may overstate earnings (O’Brien 1988).  
 
Note that a key issue to emerge from recent high-profile financial scandals such as Enron, Global 
Crossing, and Waste Management in the US, Independent Insurance in the UK, and HIH Insurance in 
Australia, is the so-called “revolving door,” where a company hires senior financial reporting executives 
directly from its external audit firm (Clikeman, 1998). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 resulted in 
restrictions being placed on this so-called “revolving-door.” In each of these financial statement fraud 
cases, key corporate personnel responsible for financial reporting were hired from the company’s external 
auditor. This legislation includes a provision (Section 206) that forbids public companies in the US from 
hiring senior financial reporting personnel from their external auditors for up to one year from the 
individual’s departure from the audit firm. While such employment restrictions have been debated in the 
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past (American Institute Of Certified Public Accountants, 1978; Independence Standard Board, 2000; Pitt 
2002), the new rule is the first to specifically forbid this practice.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief presentation of the data, section 1 is devoted to the 
decomposition of the bias according to country and sector. In section 2, we analyze the properties of the 
biais according to the year anticipations are made. Section 3 deals with the capitalization effect. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
I. Data description 
 
We realised our study on the consensus1 mean estimates of 21 countries for which companies belong to 
the MSCI universe, i.e. 239 218 monthly EPS and 2745 firms2,  3 for the period July 1987 to September 
2003. After deletion of the missing data, the sample is made of 210 726 observations (either 2 472 
companies). 
 
Table 1 
Description of the sample 
COUNTRY Number of firms % 
ATS 28 2.34 
AUD 18 1.50 
BEF 25 2.09 
CAD 89 7.42 
CHF 62 5.17 
DEM 79 6.59 
DKK 25 2.09 
ESP 46 3.84 
FIM 31 2.59 
FRF 83 6.92 
GBP 101 8.42 
HKD 27 2.25 
IEP 6 0.50 
ITL 63 5.25 
JPY 17 1.42 
NLG 28 2.34 
NOK 35 2.92 
PTE 15 1.25 
SEK 48 4.00 
SGD 32 2.67 
US 341 28.44 
 
We selected all the followed companies that have, on average, at least 6 analysts take part in the consensus 
and at least three successive forecasts are available, so that the concept of consensus simultaneously keeps 
a sense from space and temporal viewpoints. 191 072 forecasts of earnings per share constitute our 
sample (either 1 819 companies). 
 
                                                          
1 We do not avoid measurement bias to which a consensus is susceptible, but using individual forecasts inevitably means there will 
be an element of double counting. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) indicate that the double counting may result in forecast 
accuracy and bias being overstated.  
2 The definition of forecast and reported EPS varies from country to country but in most cases they are based on the EPS as used 
in published financial statements. For more details and examples, see for instance Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001).  
3 It happens that 2 securities of the same firm differ only on tax arguments. In this case, the forecasts of benefit of only one were 
available in our sample. The forecasts being the same ones, we supplemented the base if necessary. 
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In order to make comparable the horizons, we retain only the companies whose fiscal year finishes in 
December. Let us note that the majority of the companies finish their fiscal year in December, except for 
the Japanese (87% of the companies finish their fiscal year in March) and Australian companies (66% of 
the companies finish their fiscal year in June). The sample is composed in fine of 1 199 firms (115 136 
observations)4. 
 
The forecast errors form an invaluable indicator, allowing us to judge the quality of the analysts’ estimates. 
On several successive horizons, the forecast errors provide information a posteriori for the way  which  
analysts revise their anticipations. They enable us to see whether the analysts are mistaken on the 
achievements by over or under estimating them in a systematic way. Analysts' forecast error (AFE) is 
computed as the Average EPS forecast minus the actual EPS reported by IBES, divided by the absolute 
value of the actual EPS; nonzero AFE provides obviousness of bias. 
 
T,i
T,iT,h,i
h,i A
)AF(
AFE
−=  
 
Where F corresponds to the forecast of the earning per share of company i, concerning its fiscal year T, 
calculated on a horizon h; A represents the realization of the earning per share being the subject of the 
forecast5.  
 
Outliers are evident in the upper and lower tails of the AFE distribution. In order to eliminate undue 
influence by extreme values, distributions are winsorized at 1% for all subsequent analysis. However, as 
Collins and Hopwood (1980) point out, “there is no unique definition or value that defines an outlier”. 
The bias was calculated by country, sector and horizon. Concerning the forecast horizon, we selected 
horizons going from 24 months to -1 month6. We consider the time lag between fiscal year-end and 
annual announcement date, as well as the IBES variable reporting lag (Cornell and Landsman, 1989): a 
negative horizon corresponds to a forecast carried out beyond the date of fiscal year end. Thus, a forecast 
in -1 month corresponds to a forecast carried out in January of the year T for a realization in December of 
the year (T-1). 
 
Univariate statistics for AFE are presented in Table 2. The positive mean and median indicate that 
analysts’ forecasts are optimistically biased.  
 
The Mean bias decreases regularly until becoming almost null at a horizon -1, i.e. as more predisclosure 
information becomes available and uncertainty over the period’s earnings decline (cf. Elton, Gruber and 
Gultekin, 1984; Brown, Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski, 1987). In addition, it is observed that the mean 
of negative bias is largely lower than that of positive bias. Furthermore, the number of positive and 
negative bias is almost equivalent at shorter horizons. Thus, for short horizons, the positive mean bias 
relates to the fact that experts with a positive bias mislead more than those which carry out a negative bias, 
rather than the fact that there are more experts who are mistaken positively than negatively.   
 
Concerning the median bias, it is null at a horizon of 0 and -1 month (between the end-year date and the 
date of publication).  
 
                                                          
4 We will separately study the Japanese firms that finish their fiscal year in March (14% of the total sample).  
5 We use actual earnings as a deflator. Various other deflators including price and/or the previous level of earnings, have been 
used in other studies. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) indicate they have replicated their tests using different deflators and have 
found the results to be qualitatively similar.  
6 Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) in each European country, the short horizon forecasts had considerable predictive content 
explaining in excess of 50% of the observed changes in EPS. At 12 months it explains only 3%. This appears to suggest that, in 
general, forecasts made more than twelve months before the accounting year-end have little predictive value. This apparent 
forecast inefficiency may offer an opportunity to investment practitioners. Investors who incorporate earnings forecasts in their 
stock selection procedures may be able to improve returns by explicitly adjusting their model for observed regularities in earnings 
forecast errors. The caveat is that these regularities differ in incidence and magnitude across the countries, companies and time 
studied.  
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Table 2 
Statistics of AFE world 
HORIZON mean mean neg mean pos median median neg median pos obs obs neg nobs pos std std neg std pos
24 0.214553 -0.20314 0.481131 0.074074 -0.14762 0.284483 5629 2162 3423 0.522047 0.186681 0.494277
23 0.211206 -0.19742 0.47959 0.069496 -0.14064 0.28044 6006 2354 3614 0.520028 0.182717 0.496401
22 0.210273 -0.19778 0.47585 0.065421 -0.13942 0.274497 6625 2590 4004 0.523011 0.183692 0.502192
21 0.203129 -0.19846 0.467156 0.061043 -0.14154 0.266734 6960 2718 4181 0.51653 0.184251 0.496914
20 0.208067 -0.19573 0.469509 0.062428 -0.1396 0.264329 7291 2828 4410 0.517962 0.185109 0.498146
19 0.213366 -0.194 0.467923 0.064583 -0.13562 0.266057 7563 2876 4641 0.519292 0.184842 0.50019
18 0.212288 -0.19262 0.462171 0.064014 -0.13232 0.26087 7808 2943 4813 0.51481 0.184694 0.495898
17 0.206564 -0.18987 0.459787 0.059818 -0.12941 0.257143 8329 3204 5065 0.513078 0.184261 0.497367
16 0.20315 -0.18553 0.453837 0.057143 -0.12421 0.25239 8324 3219 5042 0.506675 0.184997 0.492108
15 0.196553 -0.18286 0.445064 0.054201 -0.12107 0.245763 8474 3297 5097 0.50014 0.184979 0.488116
14 0.184621 -0.18057 0.432655 0.047441 -0.11823 0.237228 8450 3355 5006 0.489359 0.185193 0.479305
13 0.174383 -0.17849 0.422477 0.041126 -0.11654 0.223215 8691 3526 5077 0.481409 0.18343 0.47414
12 0.171029 -0.17669 0.420472 0.037196 -0.11407 0.216912 8783 3604 5087 0.481723 0.182639 0.478144
11 0.159864 -0.17487 0.409987 0.031884 -0.1126 0.207696 8885 3743 5061 0.472183 0.183173 0.469863
10 0.152505 -0.17237 0.400796 0.026966 -0.10813 0.201796 9032 3842 5089 0.464344 0.182695 0.464429
9 0.148914 -0.16678 0.394511 0.024049 -0.10272 0.195467 9168 3937 5125 0.458575 0.181461 0.462124
8 0.146095 -0.15909 0.380396 0.022222 -0.09705 0.183728 9309 3964 5233 0.448756 0.176426 0.456908
7 0.142128 -0.1546 0.366137 0.02351 -0.09035 0.168111 9459 3984 5354 0.440408 0.179942 0.449924
6 0.136017 -0.14792 0.351902 0.021712 -0.08582 0.16 9578 4037 5399 0.426378 0.173174 0.439005
5 0.12679 -0.14208 0.336784 0.017167 -0.07974 0.148243 10083 4300 5610 0.41429 0.172196 0.431002
4 0.117481 -0.13321 0.318191 0.013518 -0.07381 0.135714 10032 4302 5505 0.397331 0.167008 0.41946
3 0.107452 -0.12704 0.300792 0.010025 -0.06877 0.1233 10190 4432 5512 0.38338 0.164505 0.409712
2 0.097566 -0.11737 0.287807 0.0049 -0.05921 0.109559 10175 4553 5306 0.369061 0.15709 0.404513
1 0.085089 -0.10961 0.267157 0.00043 -0.05302 0.097826 10442 4780 5287 0.348024 0.152319 0.387704
0 0.067678 -0.10407 0.238546 0 -0.05085 0.085098 9348 4394 4569 0.319871 0.149008 0.360621
-1 0.062805 -0.11155 0.235838 0 -0.05642 0.083333 8411 3956 4111 0.319404 0.154205 0.355435
 
The dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts also tends to decrease with the forecast horizon, but always 
remains much more important for the experts having a positive bias. In other words, experts who have a 
positive bias are less "homogeneous" than those who hold a negative bias. 
The disparity of the countries and sectors lead us to a decomposition of the bias by country or sector.  
 
I.1. Decomposition of the bias by country 
 
We synthesized the descriptive statistics each country and various forecast horizons. In a -1 month 
horizon, the mean is of 0.025 for the US (median –1.9e-16), 0.072 for France (median 0.0127), 0.085 for 
Germany (median 0.0026), 0.053 for Great Britain (median –4e-6) and -0.087 for Canada (median 0).  
 
We reproduced in Figure 1 the mean of all countries forecasts bias as well as the means of positive bias on 
the one hand and negative bias on the other hand. For certain countries, we have very few observations 
(cf. Table 2), as is the case for Ireland (6 firms) and Portugal (15 firms).  
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Figure 1 
Bias by horizon and by country 
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ATS AU BE CA CH DE DK ESP FIM FRF GB HK IEP ITL JPY NL NO PT SE SG US
mean 
mean neg
mean pos
 
Table 3 
Statistics by country 
Country Capit (%) Number of Firms Capit Min* Capit Max* 
ATS 0.25 28 119.9635 3030.608 
AUD 0.41 18 243.6843 10966.75 
BEF 0.80 25 198.8655 10349.8 
CAD 3.65 89 53.51238 49276.02 
CHF 4.59 62 19.01001 103410.3 
DEM 6.41 79 48.81234 85273.21 
DKK 0.51 25 37.51921 7584.088 
ESP 1.56 46 109.7008 25603.55 
FIM 1.02 31 108.7807 48283.88 
FRF 6.22 83 244.054 66629.09 
GBP 12.07 101 206.2583 149601.3 
HKD 1.25 27 266.8892 34077.49 
IEP 0.20 6 138.5009 7354.547 
ITL 3.19 63 55.37956 46379.22 
JPY 1.04 17 982.6461 17317.1 
NLG 3.18 28 409.2178 74160.24 
NOK 0.37 35 139.732 8513.281 
PTE 0.40 15 97.87147 9502.182 
SEK 1.77 48 314.1159 29567.06 
SGD 0.71 32 101.3285 9531.257 
US 50.40 341 508.3113 202538.5 
Note: * in $ 
 
From Table 3, essentially American companies compose our sample, in terms of capitalization and 
number of firms. England is second, (12.07% of the capitalization of our sample with 101 firms), followed 
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by Germany (6.41% of the capitalization ) and then Canada (89) and France (83) in terms of number of 
firms. 
 
In Figure 1, we deferred the same information by country and horizon. We observe a very atypical profile 
for Japan with an important bias for large horizons. The profiles of mean bias seem quasi-similar for the 
US and GBP. The mean bias is of the same magnitude for the European countries, yet one  can observe 
differences in terms of positive and/or negative bias. Thus, positive and negative mean bias in the Italian 
and German markets appear more important than those in France, GBP or NLG. The number of 
observations is very diverse according to country, with a dominating weight in the United States.  
 
Note that the behaviour of reported EPS may be influenced by accounting practices that either smooth or 
exaggerate the underlying earnings behaviour. Accounting practices could affect the analysts’ disposable 
information in terms of frequency, timeless and scope of disclosure. These elements can affect the 
capacity of the analysts to carry out accurate forecasts. 
 
For example, in France quarterly revenue statements are published, whereas in all the other countries, 
semi-annual accounts are issued, except in Switzerland where no interim accounts are required. Compared 
to the annual statements, the time limit for disclosure varies from five to seven months for all countries 
except Italy (four months) and Germany (nine months). Rees (1998) carried out a comparison of 
accounting measurements of seven European countries. In only two cases the countries have the same 
accounting practices (Sweden-Norway and UK-Ireland). Taxation is also expected to impact differently on 
accounting practices across the sample: Alford and Al (1993) showed that only Ireland, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom have accountings systems relatively independent from the influence of the taxes. 
In the other countries, one can suppose that the managers have an incentive to use accountings practices 
that - in the short run - depress taxable earnings (firms with tax dominated accounting practices may be 
expected to declare a more conservative income stream than otherwise, delaying profit recognition 
wherever possible). Basu and al. (1996) found that analysts’ forecast errors are higher for countries with a 
greater degree of alignment between tax and financial reporting. An empirical relation can be due to a lack 
of information on accountings disclosure, tending to be lower in countries with a high alignment between 
tax and financial reporting (Alford and al. 1993), as there is evidence that analysts’ forecasts are less 
accurate for firms with less informative financial disclosure policies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  
 
One can expect the quality of information on the accounts to affect the quality of the forecasts (Hopwood 
and al 1982). Lang and Lundhohlm (1996) underlined the fact that the forecasts of the analysts are more 
precise for the companies having adopted more informative communication policies. Saudagaran and 
Biddle (1992) classified the European countries according to their policy of information communication: 
best quality is awarded to the U.K., followed by the Netherlands, France, Germany and then Switzerland. 
Basu and al. (1996) also underlined higher forecast error for countries that communicate less. 
 
Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) showed that in Europe the three countries with the most accurate 
analysts forecasts (NLG, GBP and Ireland) are also those with the lowest alignment between  financial 
reporting and taxation, and they also have the highest disclosure ranks. This is consistent with the 
evidence of Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Basu and al. (1996). The Netherlands and the UK also stand 
out as having a high degree of stock market association - with the implication that there is more pressure 
to produce efficient forecasts and resources will be devoted to this end.  
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I.2. Decomposition of the bias by sector 
 
Figure 2 
Bias by horizon and by sector 
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Table 4 
Statistics by sector 
Sector capit (%) Number of firms Capit Min* Capit Max* 
consumer discretionary 11.37 193 38.40814 129325.2 
consumer staples 5.71 66 37.51921 84466.25 
Energy 7.15 63 138.5009 130977.6 
Financials 24.81 223 119.9635 202538.5 
Health care 12.85 61 108.7807 149601.3 
Industrials 9.45 232 48.81234 179121.7 
information technology 7.84 74 139.732 96706.25 
Materials 5.43 179 19.01001 39049.37 
telecommunication services 10.03 42 498.9263 87414.08 
Utilities 5.37 80 216.6382 22527.38 
Note : *in $ 
 
In the Figure 2, we deferred the mean bias, as well as the mean of positive bias and the mean of negative 
bias, by sector and horizon (from 24 to -1 month). In spite of a sometimes run up against profile, we will 
observe a decrease of the mean bias with the horizon. In addition, it is observed that some sectors are 
more prone to bias: the information technology, materials, telecom and to a lesser extent, industrials and 
consumer discretionary sectors. The utilities sector is characterized by the weakest mean bias regardless of 
the horizon. One also observes that the important mean bias observed for some sectors are more the fact 
of high mean positive bias than high mean negative bias. Even for weak horizons (0 or -1), mean positive 
bias remains about 20%, whereas mean negative biases are about  -10%. 
 
Table 4 recapitulates the sector distribution of our sample in terms of capitalisation. The sectors whose 
capitalisations are highest are financials (24.81%), health care (12.85%), consumer discretionary (11.37%) 
and telecommunication services (10.03%). In addition, the number of firms gives us an indication to the 
importance of sector concentration: for example, the health care and telecom sectors are very 
concentrated, whereas the industrials and materials sectors are characterized by a lower degree of 
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concentration. The utilities sector has the weakest capitalisation with a high number of firms, implying the 
presence of many firms of mean or small size. 
 
II. Decomposition of the bias by year 
 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts generally are optimistic and are increasingly inaccurate the longer the forecast 
horizon. While these results appear to hold for all countries investigated, there are country, industry and 
year specific differences. Further analysis of forecast bias was conducted with the sample segmented by 
industry, country and year.  
 
Figure 3 
World bias by horizon and by year 
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Confirming our result (cf. Figure 3), in their study, Hong and Kubik (2003) conclude there is some 
support for claims that Wall Street lost any self-discipline to produce accurate research during the recent 
stock market mania. Rewards were less sensitive to accuracy and more sensitive to optimism during the 
stock market boom of the late nineties. Bias in 2001 and 2002 are comparable with those obtained at the 
beginning of the Nineties during the housing market crisis: mean positive biases are about 55% to 30% 
for horizons from 24 to –1 month respectively! Note that for shorter forecast horizons, the mean bias 
became negative in 1999, with a positive mean bias becoming weaker (about 15 to 20%) over our sample 
period: however the low value of the bias is not closer related to "less biased" positive forecasts than in 
other years, but to realised values carried which flew away following the technological bubble7, implying 
an undervaluation on behalf of the experts. 
 
Year 2000 (correspondent with forecasts carried out over the period December 1998 (for the forecast at 
24 months) to January 2001 (for the forecast at -1 months)) is the year for which the mean bias remained 
the weakest on the whole of the horizons, without significant revisions. Given that the profiles of mean  
positive and negative bias are identical to those observed during other years, this certainly implies that in 
2000 the volume of negative mean bias was more important, as one can observe it in Figure 4:  one notes 
during for the year 2000 that the proportion of negative bias is always higher than 50%, whatever the 
horizon. This interpretation can be related to the fact that the forecasts carried out during 1999 are 
                                                          
7 Recall that the bias is indeed calculated as a difference between an anticipated and an observed values.  
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marked by the Russian8 and LTCM crisis at the beginning of the year and the forecasts carried out during 
2000 are marked by the bursting of the technological bubble in March. 
 
Figure 4 
Percentage of negative bias 
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Hong and Kubik (2003) attempt to measure the career concerns of security analysts using a panel of 
information on the brokerage houses employment and earnings forecast histories of roughly 12 000 
analysts working for 600 brokerage houses between 1983 and 2000. Controlling for accuracy, they find 
that analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts (forecasts greater than the consensus) are more likely 
to experience favourable job separations: a plausible interpretation of these findings is that while accuracy 
matters, brokerage houses also value relatively optimistic analysts presumably because they help promote 
stocks and hence generate investment banking business and trading commissions. Moreover, they have 
cut their period of study into two sub samples and observe strong evidence that accuracy matters less for 
career concerns in the 1996 to 2000 period than in the 1986-1995 period. There is slightly weaker evidence 
that forecast optimism also matters more for career concerns during the late period. These findings are 
consistent with observations in the financial press that brokerage houses threw whatever concern they had 
for objectivity in their research out the window in the midst of the stock mania of the late 1990s, as the 
job description for being an analyst became more tied to promoting stocks. They are also consistent with 
the optimism bias having increased in the 1990s (Dreman and Berry, 1995).  
 
Our sample is dominated by the American firms: it is thus interesting to break it down by country', in 
order to be able to compare the bias dynamics. However, such decomposition only makes sense for the 
countries that we have a sufficient number of observations. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 correspond to the mean bias 
observed for the United States, United-Kingdom, Germany and France9. Concerning the United 
Kingdom, we observe a dynamic bias very similar to that of the United States, with only certain levels of 
bias slightly higher, particularly at the beginning of the Nineties. One finds a similar phenomenon for 
Germany in 1993 and in France between 1991 and 1994, which one can certainly connect to the crisis of 
the EMS, intervened at the end of 1992, with the exit of the United Kingdom. For France and United 
                                                          
8 One can also think of the consequences of the Brazilian financial crisis.  
9 For some horizons, we did not defer the mean bias value, since the number of observations was too limited. It is primarily the 
case for the beginning of the period and/or long horizons of forecast.  
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Kingdom, one finds relatively weak mean bias (even negative) at the end of 1999 and during 2000, as well 
as very high bias in 2001 and 2002 (because of high positive mean bias). Concerning Germany, the shaky 
profile (the sample is a reduced size) makes it difficult to interpret the bias dynamics over the recent years. 
However, one observes an increase in the positive mean bias over the last two years. 
 
Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees, in comparing European countries, found that in the industry-based analysis 
the analysts’ forecasts for the health care and public utilities were the most accurate, while consumer 
durables and transportation were the least accurate. Part of the explanation may be the low earnings 
volatility for the first two industries and the high volatility for the last two. They note that the four years 
with the least accurate forecasts are 1990-1993.  
 
As for the study country by country, we retained only the sectors for which we have sufficient 
observations, namely materials, financials, consumer discretionary and industrials. In Figures 6.1 to 6.4, 
obviously one finds the outstanding events observed on the world figure, namely the  high bias at the 
beginning of the Nineties, the weak bias (even negative) in 1999 and 2000 and again an extremely high 
bias since 2001. However, the observation of the figures shows that clear sector differences do appear. 
For example, bias concerning the materials and financials sectors present relatively heterogeneous profiles: 
for the financials sector, the years 1994 to 2000 correspond to years for which mean bias are relatively 
weak, whereas for the materials sector, bias is weak in 1994 and 1995 (even negative), but become high 
again in 1996. 
 
The decompositions of bias per year, country and/or sector, underline the fact that an explanatory model 
of the world bias unaware of these various dimensions, will be clearly unaware of significant information. 
These three dimensions are in addition not exhaustive: the econometric models which seek to explain the 
behaviour of bias place importance on such variables as stock exchange capitalisation, the number of 
brokers or the fact that the firms carries out benefits or losses (Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992;  Brous and 
Kini, 1993; Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998;  Han, Manry and Chaw, 2001)… the quoted 
variables correspond to micro-economic information carrying out on the company itself: their importance 
would justify the estimate of an explanatory model of the bias on an individual level. 
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Figure 5.1. US bias by horizon and by year Figure 5.3. DEM bias by horizon and by year 
   
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
mean
mean neg
mean pos
 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
mean
mean neg
mean pos
 
Figure 5.2. GBP bias by horizon and by year and % bias positive Figure 5.4. FRF bias by horizon and by year 
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Figure 6.3. Consumer discretionary bias by horizon and by year 
Figure 6.4. Industrials bias by horizon and by year
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Figure 6.1. Materials bias by horizon and by year 
Figure 6.2. financials bias by horizon and by year 
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III. Decomposition of the bias by capitalisation 
 
The aggregate bias based on a weighting by capitalisations is generally weaker than the equal-weighted 
mean of individual bias, i.e. the literature on the subject underlines the fact that small capitalisations are 
characterized by mean bias higher than large capitalisations. Brown (1997) showed that optimistic bias 
decreased over time and that it is negatively associated with firm size and analyst following. An 
explanation is that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts declines as the complexity of the forecasting 
task increases. Das and al. (1998) found that optimistic bias is more pronounced in firms whose earnings 
are relatively difficult to predict from publicly available information. Lim (2001) provides theory and 
evidence that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased for firms with less predictable 
earnings. Similarly, Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan (1998) report a positive relation between optimistic 
bias and the unpredictability of analysts’ earnings forecasts, i.e. in smaller firms.  
 
We gathered bias in two sub samples (large and small) by retaining as "large" capitalisations the higher 
third. Naturally, a decomposition by country is essential if one does not want the sub sample of  "large 
capitalisations" to be made up of only American firms. The same concern is also at the origin of sector 
decomposition:  the telecommunication sector is primarily composed of large capitalisation (the percentile 
at 66.7% is 23806.32), whereas the utilities sector is composed of companies whose capitalisations are 
weaker (the percentile at 66.7% is 7288.86) 10. 
 
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 describe the dynamics of the bias according to countries and horizons for the two sub-
samples. Concerning the United States, one observes, as waited, that the mean bias is weaker for large 
capitalisations than for the others, the spread however tending to reduce itself with the forecast horizon . 
In addition, the spread is essentially the fact of the positive mean bias:  the experts tend to over-estimate 
the benefits for moderate sized companies . One can put this phenomenon on the account of the public 
information available concerning each group of firms:  the less information the experts have, the more 
they will tend to overestimate their forecasts in order to "ensure themselves" not to underestimate the 
benefit carried out. 
 
One observes a similar behaviour of the bias for the United Kingdom, but for Germany and France, the 
spread in terms of bias for the two sub-groups of capitalization are weaker, even in Germany one observes 
spreads between the positive mean bias that are compensated by the spreads between the  negative mean 
bias. 
 
This heterogeneity by country is also observed at the sector level (Figures 8.1 to 8.4): for the materials and 
industrials sectors, bias associated with the most important capitalisations are weaker than those associated 
with moderate capitalisations. On the other hand, for the consumer discretionary and financials sectors, 
sub sample bias is indistinguables whatever the horizon for finance and on long horizons for the 
consumer discretionary sector.  
 
10 The percentiles at 66.7% for the sectors financials, materials and industrials and consumer discretionary are respectively:  
9743.66, 3143.68, 2961.97 and 4108.32. 
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Figure 7.1. US bias(by capitalisation) 
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Figure 7.2. GBP bias(by capitalisation) 
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Figure 7.3. FRF bias (by capitalisation) 
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Figure 7.4. DEM bias (by capitalisation) 
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Figure 8.3. industrials bias (by capitalisation) 
Figure 8.4. Materials bias (by capitalisation) 
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Figure 8.2. Financials  bias (by capitalisation) 
Figure 8.1. COD bias(by capitalisation) 
 
IV. Summary 
 
We realised our study on the consensus mean estimates of 21 countries for which companies belong to 
the MSCI universe, for the period July 1987 to September 2003. The bias was calculated by country, sector 
and horizon. Concerning the forecast horizon, we selected horizons going from 24 months to -1 month. 
We notably observed that:  
- the mean of the bias decreases regularly with the horizon, becoming almost null at a horizon -1, 
i.e. as more predisclosure information becomes available and uncertainty over the period’s 
earnings decline,  
- the behaviour of reported EPS may be influenced by accounting practices that either smooth or 
exaggerate the underlying earnings behaviour,  
- some sectors are more prone to bias: the information technology, materials, telecom and to a 
lesser extent, industrials and consumer discretionary sectors. The utilities sector is characterized 
by the weakest mean bias regardless of the horizon, 
- there is some support for claims that Wall Street lost any self-discipline to produce accurate 
research during the recent stock market mania. 
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